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We run a series of experiments in which subjects have to choose their level of contribution to a pure 
public good. Our design differs from the standard public good game with respect to the decision procedure. 
Instead of deciding simultaneously in each round, subjects are randomly ordered in a sequence which differs 
from round to round. We compare sessions in which subjects can observe the exact contributions from earlier 
decisions ("Sequential treatment with Information") to sessions in which subjects decide sequentially but cannot 
observe  earlier  contributions  ("Sequential  treatment  without  information").  Furthermore,  we  investigate  the 
effect of group size on aggregate contributions. Our result indicate that contributing sequentially increases the 
level of contribution to the public good when subjects are informed about the contribution levels of lower ranked 
subjects. Moreover, we observe that earlier players in the sequence try to influence positively the contributions 
of subsequent decision makers in the sequence, by making a large contribution. Such behaviour is motivated by 





In many situations agents’ efforts to provide public goods are made sequentially. It is rare that all agents 
have to decide upon their level of contribution simultaneously. Sequentiality allows later contributers to observe 
earlier contributions, and condition their contribution on those observations. The Telethon is probably the best-
known example. During some time range the amount of donations collected is on permanent display on popular 
medias, like television channels. At each point in time potential contributors are informed about cumulated 
donations since the beginning of the Telethon. Furthermore, information about specific individual contributions 
is provided from time to time. There are other examples where later contributors are informed about cumulated 
contributions of early donors, such as church contributions, contributions to public foundations or charities, 
countries’ efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, efforts to preserve natural areas, donations for helping 
populations suffering from natural catastrophes, … In contrast to the situation where contributions have to be 
made simultaneously, sequentiality is likely to affect positively individual contributions. The reason is that the 
provision  of  public  information  to  followers  about  previous  contributions  can  increase  their  contributions 
through  a  leadership  effect.  This  may  happen  when early contributors make  large  contributions  to  lead  by 
example. While several field studies support this idea (Silvermann et al., 1984, List & Lucking-Riley, 2002, 
Shang & Croson, 2003), they fail to isolate precisely the effect of available public information on the level of 
contributions.  Furthermore,  the  effect  may  depend  on  the  type  and  quantity  of  information  that  becomes 
available. For example, contributors could only observe the cumulative contributions of previous contributors, or 
their individual contributions. The size of the population of potential contributors might also affect the leadership 
effect, since with a larger population (or longer sequence), more individuals are likely to be influenced.  
 
Most experimental research on voluntary contributions to public goods, has focused on simultaneous 
contribution  environments.  In  the  standard  voluntary  contribution  experiment,  subjects  cannot  observe  the 
contributions  of  the  other  members  of  their  group  within  a  round.  Individual  contributions  are  therefore 
determined by the beliefs about all the other players’ contributions. In contrast, when contributions are made 
sequentially, later players in the sequence observe the contributions of the earlier players, and beliefs concern 
only the contributions of the remaining players. Since this is commonly known to all the players, it affects their 
contribution  whatever  their  position  in  the  game,  in  spite  of  the  asymmetric  information  structure  that  is 
generated by the game. In the Telethon example, donators usually know the cumulative donations of previous 
contributors. Later contributors who are better informed, are affected by the observation of early contributions, 
and  early  contributors  are  aware  of  their  influence  upon  them.  One  reason  for  the  influence  of  observed 
contributions  is  reciprocity.  Agents  who  decide  later  and  observe  high  levels  of  contribution  might  be 
encouraged to make a larger contribution than they would have done otherwise. On the other hand, if they 3 
observe  low  contributions  they  might  also  lower  their  expressed  contribution  compared  to  their  intended 
contribution. Another reason is that agents who decide earlier and who expect that later decision makers will be 
influenced by the observed contributions, can be tempted to try to encourage them by deciding to make a high 
contribution.  This  is  the  so-called  "leadership-effect"  or  "leading-by-example"  effect,  which  has  been 
investigated in previous experimental research by Potters et al. (2003) in the case of a public good and by 
Moxnes & van der Heijden (2000) in the case of a public bad. Potters et al. (2003) showed that contributions are 
larger in a (two-player) sequential move game than in a simultaneous move game, when the value of the public 
good is private knowledge. In the sequential contribution game, subjects came closer to the optimum level of 
contribution. In Moxnes and van der Heijden (2000) public bad experiment, one subject is called upon in each 
period to act as a leader, i.e. his contribution is made public before the other members of the group decide 
simultaneously. Their results show that subjects invest 15% less in the public bad when there is a leader who sets 
the “good example” compared to the simultaneous move game. Empirical studies also showed the importance of 
the leadership-effect in various contexts (List & Lucking-Reiley, 2002, Shang & Croson, 2003). Experimental 
and empirical studies suggest therefore that contributions are influenced by the informational context induced by 
sequentiality, although the standard prediction is that there should be no effect.  
 
There  is  however  a  question  whether  the  observed  effects  are  due  to  the  information generated  by 
sequential moves or by sequentiality as such, even if no information is provided to subsequent players in the 
decision making sequence. According to standard game theory, a change in the timing of moves has no effect on 
the  agents’  choice  of  actions,  as  long  as  the  change  in  the  order  of  moves  does  not  reveal  any  further 
information. In  other  words,  if  agents’ actions  are  unobservable,  a  game  in  which  moves  are  sequential is 
strategically equivalent to a game in which moves are simultaneous. In contrast to the standard prediction, a 
series of papers by Rapoport and colleagues (Rapoport et al., 1993, Budescu et al., 1995, Suleiman et al., 1996, 
Rapoport, 1997) exhibit a pure positional effect in common pool resource dilemma games. They showed that 
there is a first mover advantage, in that the first to decide has a tendency to take a larger part. Furthermore, for 
later decision-makers in the sequence, there is a tendency to take less, even in a situation with no information 
asymmetries (request disclosure). Cooper et al. (1993) also found a first mover advantage in battle of sexes 
games. When the game is played sequentially without observability, the equilibrium which is most favourable to 
the first mover is played more frequently
1. In a recent study, Weber and Camerer, (2004) also showed that 
simply changing the timing of moves affects subjects’ behavior in an ultimatum bargaining game and in a weak 
                                                 
1 In the two players battle-of-sexes game, identifying one of the players as the “first player” and the other as the “second 
player” resulted in a significant increase of the frequency of the preferred equilibrium outcome by the first player (see 
Cooper et al., 1993). In this example, the timing effect can be attributed to a first mover advantage, or more generally to a 
positional advantage (Budescu et al., 1995). The same type of explanation applies to the case of a step-level public goods 
game or resource dilemma game. In each of these games, there are multiple equilibria in pure strategies, a situation which 
leads to a coordination problem. 4 
link coordination game even if the same information set is used when moves are sequential or simultaneous. A 
theoretical  justification  of  such  observed  differences  might  be  found  in  the  idea  of  “virtual  observability” 
introduced by Amershi et al. (1989).  In the light of the literature on timing of moves effects, it is important to 
separate  carefully  the  leadership  effect  from  any  induced  effect  of  the  sequentiality  of  decisions
2.  To  our 
knowledge, all the experiments which studied order of play, with the exception of Güth et al. (1998), involved a 
coordination problem. Common pool resource games and step-level public goods games both admit multiple 
Nash  equilibria  simply  by  permutating  players.  In  contrast,  our  experimental game  has  a  unique  dominant 
strategy equilibrium for the one-shot game corresponding to the null contribution. According to Güth et al.’s 
(1988) we should not observe a higher frequency of deviations from equilibrium play in the positional order 
protocol than in the simultaneous play game. 
 
In this paper we report the results of a public good experiment in which we try to dissociate the pure 
effect of sequentiality which was documented by many experiments, from the leadership effect. We designed an 
experiment  in  which  subjects  contribute  sequentially,  with  two  information  conditions  :  a  sequential  game 
without information and a sequential game with information. In the treatment without information, individuals 
decide sequentially but cannot observe earlier contributions. In the treatment with information, subjects observe 
the contributions of subjects who decided earlier in the sequence. The reference treatment is a simultaneous 
public good game (no sequential move and no information). Since the leadership effect might depend on the 
length of the sequence, we consider two different population sizes. We expect that early contributions might be 
larger in larger  populations. Since  we  expect  the leadership  effect  to  vanish within  a sequence,  we  should 
observe significant differences in contributions according to the rank of the subjects in the decision sequence, 
whatever the population size. Our data clearly indicate that sequentiality alone has no effect on contributions 
whereas the observation of previous contributions of lower ranked subjects increases the level of contribution to 
                                                 
2 Coordination problems might be solved by generating some kind of asymmetry in the game, as suggested by 
Schelling (1960). An asymmetry in the game can be generated by simply labelling subjects according to priority of moves 
(first mover, second mover, …), so that some combinations of actions become more salient than others and lead therefore to 
equilibrium  selection.  Another  way  to  solve  the  coordination  problem  is  by  “manipulating  the  Nash  equilibrium”  as 
proposed by Amershi et al., (1989). The underlying idea is that altering the game from simultaneous moves to positional 
order generates “virtual observability”. Players are therefore likely to behave in the same way under non-observability than 
they would behave under observability as is the case in a standard sequential game. By relying on forward induction, a 
subgame perfect solution is thereby induced instead of the original Nash equilibrium. In simultaneous moves games with 
multiple Nash equilibria, the coordination problem would be (partly) solved by applying subgame perfection to a game with 
virtual observability, i.e. “players expect first movers to choose strategies as if subsequent players observe them perfectly 
and  respond  optimally”  ‘Weber  and  Camerer,  2004).  The  idea  is  that  subgame  perfection  combined  with  virtual 
observability is used as a coordination device by selecting one of the Nash equilibria of the simultaneous moves game
2. This 
idea is supported by Güth et al. (1998). On the basis of a two-player game, they showed that when virtual observability 
predicts a departure from equilibrium play (of the simultaneous moves game), by the first mover, subjects actually choose 
the various strategy combinations in the positional order protocol with the same frequencies than in the simultaneous moves 
game. Furthermore, they show that a deviation from equilibrium play becomes more likely when the associated outcome if 
more fair.  
 5 
the public good. We also observe a decline of the level of contribution with the rank of the contributor when 
information is available to the subjects. Finally, we find that the length of the sequence has a negative impact on 
the level of contributions.  
 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design and section 3 provides 
the results of our study. In section 4 we discuss the results and conclude. 
 
2. Experimental design  
 
The experiment consisted of 16 sessions of 15 periods each. Experimental sessions were conducted both 
at the University of Rennes
3 and at the university of Montpellier
4 in France. 252 subjects were recruited from 
undergraduate classes in business and economics at both sites. None of the subjects had previously participated 
in a public good experiment and none of them participated in more than one session. The experiment was 
computerized using the Ztree program. On average, a session lasted about an hour and 20 minutes
5 including 
initial instruction and payment of subjects.  
 
We set up an experimental design that allows us to investigate the effect of information accumulation on 
individual contributions in a sequential contribution environment. The reference treatment is a simultaneous 
voluntary contribution game. At the beginning of each period, each member of a group of subjects is endowed 
with 10 tokens that he can invest in a private account and in a group account . Let ci be the contribution of player 
i to the group account and c-i the aggregate contribution of all other players - except i – to the group account. 
u(ci, c-i) is player i’s payoff if he contributes ci and the other players contribute c-i. We assume that each account 
has a constant marginal return, which we set equal to 1 for the private account and 0.5 for the group account 
(equation (1)). Note that with our assumptions the marginal per capita return is also equal to 0.5. The unique 
dominant strategy equilibrium of the one-shot game is for each player to contribute ci = 0. The constituent game 
was repeated exactly 15 periods. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium for the repeated game is for each 
player to contribute ci = 0 each period. On the other hand, the group optimum is achieved if each player chooses 
to contribute the total endowment.  
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3 CREM (Centre de recherche en Economie et Management) , 
4 LAMETA (Laboratoire de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée) 
5 The sequential treatments took slightly more time in large groups.  6 
In the reference treatment all subjects simultaneously select the amount of their endowment that they 
want to contribute to the group account. Subjects were instructed to indicate only their contribution to the group 
account,  the  remainder  of  their  endowment  being  automatically  invested  in  their  private  account.  Tokens 
invested in the group account generate the same payoff for each member of the group.  
 
Since we shall focus on the effects of differential information on individual contributions, we identify 
our treatments by the information available for the subjects. In the benchmark treatment, called "simultaneous 
treatment" subjects take their decisions simultaneously, and therefore none of the players has an informational 
advantage.  In  a  second  treatment  called  sequential  treatment  without  information,  decisions  are  taken 
sequentially. This is done by assigning in the beginning of each round each subject to a rank in the decision 
sequence. In this treatment, subjects know to which rank they are assigned but none of the subject has an 
informational advantage. Indeed subjects are not informed about the individual contributions of each lower 
ranked subject. Finally, the third treatment is identical to the previous treatment except that each subject is 
informed about the individual contributions of each lower ranked subject. The least informed subject is the 
subject who is ranked first in the sequence whereas the most informed subject is the one who is ranked last in the 
sequence.  
 
Therefore, the difference in contributions between the benchmark and the sequential treatment without 
information measure the pure effect of sequentiality on contributions. We hypothesize, based on the results of 
Budescu et al., 1995 and Weber and Camerer, 2004, that simply knowing that one player moves first might 
affect contributions. Indeed, Weber and Camerer, (2004) have shown that a change of the timing of moves 
affects  behavior  in  the  ultimatum  bargaining  game  and  the  weak  link  coordination  game  even  if  the same 
information set is used when moves are sequential or simultaneous. The difference in contributions between the 
sequential treatments with and without information is interpreted as the effect of the information asymmetry. We 
hypothesize  that  the  effect  of  information  on  contributions  is  positive.  Finally,  the  difference  between  the 
sequential treatment with information and the Benchmark treatment measures the effects of both sequentiality 
and information asymmetry.  
 
While the information condition is our main treatment variable, we also study the impact of group size 
on the level of contribution in the sequential contribution environment. We compare treatments with 4 subjects, 
called small groups hereafter, to treatments with 8 subjects (called large groups). Increasing the group size 
lengthens the sequence and therefore might have a positive or negative influence on individual contributions. As 
the size of the contribution to the group account increases, the temptation to free ride in order to make a large 
payoff rises. This implies that the higher ranked subjects are likely to free ride more. This would imply a 7 
negative effect of group size on the average contribution. On the other hand, if subjects reciprocate earlier 
contributions in the sequence, the average contributions might become larger in larger groups. Furthermore, 
there  might  be  a  stronger  leadership  effect  since  early  players  can  influence  more  subsequent  players.  In 
particular the fourth player still has an influence in large groups in contrast to small groups. It is not obvious 
therefore what the effect of increasing the size of the group will be. The same presentation was used for all 
treatments
6. At the end of each period, the computer screen displayed the subject’s investment decision, the total 
group contribution and the earnings of the group account as well as the total earnings. Cumulated earnings since 
the beginning of the game, as well as the number of the period were also on display. After each period, subjects 
could see their detailed records since the beginning of the experiment. Table 1 provides a summary of our 
experimental  design.  The  first  four  columns  indicate  the  session  number,  the  corresponding  treatment,  the 
number of groups and the number of subjects that took part in the session. The last column indicates the group 
size (4 or 8 members per group). A partner matching protocol was in effect for all sessions. 
 
[Table 1: About Here] 
 
3. Results 
This section is organized as follows. Subsection 3.1 reports patterns in average contributions in the 
benchmark and the sequential treatments with and without information. We analyze the treatments in relation to 
each other and to the benchmark treatment, and evaluate the hypotheses stated in section two. In Subsections 3.2 
we study the determinants of the contribution behavior separately for each treatment.  
 
3.1. Average individual contribution  
 
Figure 1 and figure 2 illustrate the time path of individual contributions by period respectively for small 
and large groups. The period number is shown on the horizontal axis and the average individual contribution on 
the vertical axis, where the maximum possible individual contribution is 10. These figures show the same pattern 
                                                 
6To control  for the existence of a possible "framing effect", we ran two sessions with a variant of the reference treatment, 
labeled " simultaneous treatment with framing". This control was required because the sequential version of the contribution 
game required a slight alteration of the usual presentation of the instructions. For this variant the investment in the group 
account is presented as an explicit addition of individual contributions which matches the presentation that was used for the 
sequential contribution treatments.  The instructions pointed out that each subject's contribution would be identified by an 
index, e.g. subject i's contribution is noted Ii, and that the payoff of the group account would be given by 0.5´(I1+I2+...+IN).  
This point was described to the subjects in the following language :  
"I1 is member 1's investment  to the collective account  
I2 is member 2's investment  to the collective account  
I3 is member 3's investment  to the collective account  
This  presentation,  by  making  explicit  the  summation  of  individual  contributions,  could  have  influenced  the  subjects 
decisions in a non predictable way. However, the results indicate no significant difference at any level of significance in 
average contribution between the simultaneous treatments with and without framing.  
 8 
for  all  treatments  :  there  is  initially  a  positive  level  of  contribution  to  the  group  account  and  the  level  of 
contribution declines with repetition (except for the sequential treatment with information in large groups, in 
which the average contribution level does not change appreciably as the game is repeated). This result is in line 
with several other experiments that have documented that the contributions tend to decline with repetition (Isaac 
et al. 1984, Isaac and Walker, 1988, Andreoni, 1988, Weimann, 1994, Keser, 1996).  
 
[Figures 1, 2 and table 2 about here] 
 
Result 1 summarizes our findings both about the informational effect and the order effects. 
 
Result 1 : Levels of contribution are higher under the sequential treatment with information than under 
the sequential treatment without information. Sequentiality without observability has no significant impact on 
the level of average contribution.  
 
Support  for  result  1  :  Table  2  shows  the  average  contribution  for  each  treatment.  The  first  three 
columns of table 2 indicate the average individual contribution for each small group. The last three columns 
contain  the  same  data  for  each  large  group.  Comparison  of  treatments  suggests  that  sequentiality  with 
information positively and significantly affects average contribution. Our results indicate that, for both small and 
large  groups,  average  contribution  levels  in  the  sequential  treatment  with  information  are  higher  than 
contribution levels in the sequential treatment without information. A nonparametric Mann-Whitney rank-sum 
test
7 for small groups shows that the difference in average contributions between the sequential treatments with 
and without information is significant at the p < .10 level, (z = -1.678, two-tailed). A similar test of the difference 
between the sequential treatments with and without information for large groups also indicate a positive and 
significant effect of information (z = 2.082; two tailed test).  
 
In order to isolate the pure effect of sequentiality, we compare the average level of contribution in the 
simultaneous treatment and in the sequential treatment without information. Our results indicate that for both 
small  and  large  groups  changing  the  timing  of  moves  without  changing  the  information  condition  has  no 
significant effect on contributions (respectively z = - 0.145 for small groups and z = 1.601 for large groups). The 
comparison between the simultaneous treatment and the sequential treatment with information indicate that 
introducing both sequentiality and observability of previous contributions in the sequence increases the average 
contribution level in small groups (z = - 1.843). A similar test for large groups indicates however, no significant 
difference between the two treatments (z = - 1.44; two tailed test). The insignificant difference between the 
                                                 
7 In all statistical tests reported in this paper, the unit of observation is the group. 9 
baseline treatment and the sequential treatment with information for the case of large groups suggests that the 
positive effect of information is partly offset by the negative effect induced by sequentiality alone, though this 
effect is not significant. Finally, Mann-Whitney tests of the difference of contribution between each treatment 
according  to  group  size  indicate  no  significant  effect  of  the  size.  A  Mann-Whitney  test  of  the  differences 
between the simultaneous treatment with size 4 and the simultaneous treatment with size 8 yields an insignificant 
z = 0.307.  Similar results are obtained for the sequential treatment without information (z = - 1.486 ; two-tailed) 
and for the sequential treatment with information (z = - 0.480; two tailed). 
 
Table 3 provides formal evidence about sequentiality and information effects. The dependent variable is 
the amount of tokens contributed in the t
th period. The independent variables are subject's lagged contribution, 
the lagged average contribution of the other members of the group and several dummy variables including the 
variable "information" to control for a pure information effect and the variable "order" to isolate a potential 
sequential effect. The variable "information" takes value 1 if subjects are informed about previous contributions 
in the sequence and 0 otherwise. Finally, the variable " Sequentiality×information" takes value 1 if the treatment 
introduces both sequentiality and information and 0 otherwise. In addition we also introduced a counter variable 
beginning with value 1 in the 15
th period and value 0 in the preceding periods.  
 
[Tables 3 about here] 
 
  The estimates summarized in table 3 confirm our previous findings. The specifications of the second and 
third columns reveal that individuals increase their contribution when they are informed about the contributions 
of  each  lower  ranked  subject.  Table  3  also  indicates  that  for  both  small  and  large  groups,  the  coefficient 
associated with "order alone" is not significant. This result suggests that the pure ordering effect does not emerge 
in games that admit a unique equilibrium. Indeed, the ordering effect was essentially observed so far in games 
with multiple equilibria (e.g. step-level public goods games) raising thereby a coordination problem among 
subjects. If the ordering effect requires subjects to deviate from the unique equilibrium, it is less likely to emerge 
(see Güth et al. , 1998). Finally, table 3 also indicates that the coefficients of the variables "own previous 
contribution" and "others average contribution in the previous period" are positive and highly significant. The 
interpretation of the latter results will be presented in the following sub-section 
 
3.2. Determinants of contribution 
 
We turn now to another central question of our experiment : how do sequentiality and information about 
other's contributions affect contributions ? Our answer to that question is stated in Result 2 and Result 3. Result 2 
summarizes our findings about the relationship between the information, either sent or received, and the level of 10 
individual  contributions. Our  conjecture  is  that  subjects  are  influenced  both  by  their  information  about  the 
individual  contributions  of  the  lower  ranked  subjects and  by  the  information  they  “send” to higher  ranked 
subjects trough their own contribution. In result 3 we present the effect of the rank in the group on the individual 
contribution level. 
 
Results 2 :For the simultaneous treatment and the sequential treatment without observability, the period 
t individual level of contribution is higher (a) the more he contributed in period t-1. and (b) the more other 
members of the group contributed in period t-1. For the sequential treatment with information, the period t 
individual level of contribution is higher (a) the more he contributed in period t-1,  and (b) the more members in 
lower ranks contributed in period t. 
 
Support for result 2 : Table 4 contains the estimates of regression model (2) for the simultaneous 
treatment and the sequential treatment without information: 
( ) ( ) 0 1 1 2 1
i i i
t t t c c c b b b
-
- - = + +                                                         (2) 
For the sequential treatment with information we estimate equation (3): 
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- , the average contribution of lower ranked subjects in the current period 
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-   and  a  variable  that  controls  for  the  position  in  the  group.  In  the  simultaneous  treatment  and  the 
sequential treatment without information, subjects’ contributions can only be influenced by information about 
past periods. In contrast, in the sequential treatment with information, subjects may be influenced both by the 
information received from previous periods and information from previous decisions in the sequence for the 
current period.  
 [Tables 4 about here] 
 
  If  subjects  choose  their  contribution  on  the  basis  of  their  contribution  of  the  previous  period,  the 
coefficient associated with subject's lagged contribution will be positive and significant. But subjects may also 
choose their contribution by considering the lagged average contribution of other group members. In this case 
one should observe a positive and significant coefficient for this variable. Table 4 shows that in all treatments the 
variable for subjects' own previous contribution is positive. This coefficient is significant at the 1% significance 
level for all treatments. It is not surprising that in all treatments, a subject's past contribution predicts his or her 11 
current  contribution  level.  Thus,  contributions  exhibit  some  inertia  in  that  individuals  who  make  high 
contributions in one period are more likely to do so in the next period. In addition, table 4 indicates that the 
coefficient of the variable " others average contribution in the previous period" is also positive and significant for 
the simultaneous treatment and the sequential treatment without information. High contributions on the part of 
the other group members are imitated or reciprocated with high contributions in these two treatments. However 
this coefficient is not significant for the treatment with information. This result suggests that in the sequential 
treatment with information subjects tend to disregard information from the previous period to take into account 
the more relevant information from the current period.  
 
Table 4 clearly indicates that the level of contribution is decreasing with the position in the sequence in 
the sequential treatment with information. This result is a further indication of the existence of a "leadership 
effect". Indeed when contribution decisions are made sequentially, early players in the sequence may try to 
influence  positively  the  contributions  of  subsequent  decision  makers  in  the  sequence,  by  making  a  large 
contribution. However, as the decision sequence moves towards the last player, there are less and less agents 
who  are  likely  to  be  influenced  and  therefore  the  leadership  effect  vanishes  and  as  a  consequence  the 
contribution level declines. Such behaviour of early players is motivated by their belief that subsequent players 
will reciprocate by making also a large contribution. As indicated in table 4, subjects reciprocate contributions of 
low ranked members since we observe that the coefficient associated with the variable "contribution of the 
previous ranked member" is significant and positive in the sequential treatment with information. This result 
indicates that subjects also reciprocate contributions of members who are ranked earlier in the sequence. Indeed, 
high contribution on the part of other group members in lower ranks is reciprocated by high contributions. 
Finally table 4 also reveals an end game effect in most of the treatments. 
 
Result 3 indicates how the rank in the group affects the individual contribution level.  
 
Result 3 : The level of contribution declines with the position in the group in the sequential treatment 
with information whereas it remains unaffected by the position in the sequential treatment without information .  
 
Support for result 3: 
 [Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
 
Figure 3 shows the average contribution of small groups, by rank in the game, for the two sequential 
treatments.  Figure  4  provides  similar  information  for  large  groups.  Both  figures  indicate  that  the  average 
contribution in the sequential treatment with information decreases with the position in the game. In contrast, the 12 
average level of contribution in the sequential treatments without information remains stable with the position. 
Finally, figure 3 also reveals that for small groups, the average contribution of the three first players in the 
sequence for the sequential treatment with information is larger than the average contribution in the simultaneous 
treatment. In contrast, the average contribution of the fourth player is lower than in the benchmark treatment, 
indicating a possible "end-sequence effect". Figure 4 indicates a similar pattern for large groups : the average 
contribution of the first six players in the sequence is larger than the average contribution in the simultaneous 
treatment whereas the average contribution of the last two players is lower than in the benchmark treatment. 
Figures 3 and 4 reveal that the average contribution of the early players in the sequence is higher than the 
baseline whereas the opposite is true for later players in the game. 
 
[Tables 5  and 6 about here] 
 
Further evidence about this leadership effect can be found in tables 5 and 6 which display the average 
contribution levels by position respectively for small and large groups. In both tables, the second and the fifth 
columns  indicate  the  overall  average  individual  contribution  for  each  group, respectively  for the  sequential 
treatments with and without information. The third and sixth columns give the average individual contribution 
for the first position in the group. Finally, the fourth and seventh columns provide similar information for the 
final  position  of  the  group.  Our  data  clearly  indicate  that  contributions  in  the  sequential  treatment  with 
information  are  higher  in  the  first  position  than  in  the  last  position.  On  the  contrary,  we  do  not  observe 
differences between the first and the final position for the sequential treatment without information. Statistical 
evidence  for  result  3  is  provided  in  table  7  which  summarizes  the  results  of  a  regression  of  individual 
contributions on the position in the sequence. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
The dependent variable  i c is the individual average contribution of player i. The variable "position 2" is 1 
if the player is in second position in the sequence of the game and 0 otherwise. The construction of the other 
variables is identical. The results are interpreted in relation with the omitted category, i.e. the first position in the 
game.  Table  7  indicates  that  the  position  in  the  game  does  not  influence  the  average  contribution  in  the 
sequential treatment without information. However, the level of contribution shows a significant decline with the 
position in the sequence in the sequential treatment with information, for both group sizes. Notice that the 
coefficients are weaker for early positions than for later positions, revealing a stronger tendency to free ride for 
higher ranked subjects compared to lower ranked subjects.  
 13 
  
4. Discussion and concluding comments 
 
We studied an experimental game of voluntary contributions to a public good, in which players move 
sequentially. In our test treatment later players can observe the contributions of previous players, while in our 
control treatments, all players have to make their contribution without knowing the contributions of the other 
players. Our results show that sequentiality without observability does not significantly affect the average level 
of contribution, compared to the simultaneous contribution treatment. Our result contrast with the literature on 
the positional order effect (Rapoport et al., 1993, Budescu et al., 1995, Suleiman et al., 1996, Rapoport, 1997). 
However, our voluntary contribution game has a unique equilibrium, avoiding therefore the type of coordination 
problem that arises in step-level public goods games or in common pool resources games, which are the type of 
games used to exhibit the positional order effect. Furthermore, our result is in accordance with Güth et al. 
(1998), who showed that in a game with a unique equilibrium, the positional order effect is seriously weakened.  
 
Our  main  result  is  that  the  average  level  of  contribution  is  significantly  increased,  when  subjects 
contribute sequentially and have the opportunity to observe previous contributions. Observability influences both 
early contributors, through the leadership effect, and later contributors, who reciprocate observed contributions. 
First,  our  results  reveal  that individuals  who  decide  later  and observe  high  levels  of contribution  exhibit a 
tendency to reciprocate these decisions by making a high contribution as well. This result indicates that some 
part of the subject's contribution is not intrinsically motivated but is conditioned on observed contributions, in 
line  with  earlier  findings  on  conditional  cooperation  (Keser  &  van  Winden,  2000).  However,  under 
observability, the level of contribution is no longer conditioned on the previous period average contribution, but 
on the previous contributions observed within the period. Second, subjects who decide earlier in the sequence 
and who expect that later decision makers will be influenced by their contribution, try to encourage them by 
making a large contribution. This is what we called the leadership effect. However, as the decision sequence 
moves toward the last player, implying that fewer players are likely to be influenced, the leadership effect 
vanishes. As a consequence the average contribution declines in the higher ranks of the game.  
 
From our experimental findings we conclude that with sequential contributions and observability the 
leadership effect increases the average level of contributions, independently of group size. Clearly, first movers 
do not exploit their position by making a low contribution, but in contrast make a large contribution. In some 
sense they act as if they felt moral obligation to lead by example, in order to increase group contributions. Such 
moral obligation is typically absent when contributions are made simultaneously or when contributions are made 
sequentially without observability.   14 
The fact that later contributors are influenced by the observed contributions of early players, can have 
important  policy  implications.  As  already  mentioned,  our  main  result  clearly  demonstrates  that  intrinsic 
motivation is not the sole reason why agents contribute to the public good. Posting information on previous 
contributions might be enough to increase the level of contributions, suggesting that the design of public policies 
should take into account the leadership effect. For example, public announcements of previous efforts to reduce 
emissions might increase society’s overall abatement effort. Clearly, the leadership effect alone is not sufficient 
to solve the social dilemma arising in voluntary contribution games. Fehr & Gächter (2000) showed that the 
introduction of costly punishment opportunities provides strong enough incentives to overcome the dilemma. 
Our  results  suggest  that  the  same  outcome  can  be  reached  with  less  demanding  punishment  opportunities. 
Introducing asymmetric punishment opportunities, i.e. early players can only punish later players, might provide 
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Table 1: Number of independent observations per cell  
Session 
number 




Size of the 
group 
1  Simultaneous game   5  20  4 
2   Simultaneous game #  4  16  4 
3  Simultaneous game #  4  16  4 
4  Simultaneous game   2  16  8 
5  Simultaneous game   2  16  8 
6  Simultaneous game   2  16  8 
         7  Sequential game with info  3  12  4 
8  Sequential game with info  3  12  4 
9  Sequential game with info  2  16  8 
10  Sequential game with info  2  16  8 
11  Sequential game with info  2  16  8 
12  Sequential game without info.  4  16  4 
13  Sequential game without info.  4  16  4 
14  Sequential game without info.  2  16  8 
15  Sequential game without info.  2  16  8 
16  Sequential game without info.  2  16  8 
        # simultaneous game with framing  21 
Table 2. Group Average Contribution Levels 
 
Group                                   N=4  N=8 






Null info  Order   info 

















































  2.5# 
 (2.48) 
4.95      
(1.92) 
2.05     
(1.99) 
2.96   
  (3.17) 
5.25     
(2.47) 
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# The results show no significant difference at any level of significance in average contribution between 
 the simultaneous treatments with and without framing. All simultaneous treatments with large groups were 





                          22 
Table 3: Random-effects GLS regression of Individual Contribution: Information and Order Effects 
 
  Sequ. treat.  (sequ with and 
without info) 
Treat without info. (simult and 
seq without info) 
Simult treat and seq.  treat 
with info 







































       
Order effect      -0.144  -0.175     
      (0.171)  (0.175)     
Seq*Information          0.454**  0.584*** 
          (0.190)  (0.191) 
Period 15  -1.728***  -0.055  -0.841***  -0.526*  -0.981***  -1.014*** 
  (0.462)  (0.342)  (0.326)  (0.328)  (0.331)  (0.369) 
Constant  2.028***  1.887***  1.227***  1.532***  1.701***  2.017*** 
  (0.295)  (0.238)  (0.209)  (0.288)  (0.218)  (0.279) 
Observations  784  1344  1176  1344  1064  1344 
Number of 
individu 
0.15  0.14  0.25  0.17  0.24  0.14 
 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 23 
 
Table 4: Determinants of contribution (Random-effects GLS regression)   
 
  Simult treat.  Seq treat. without info  Seq. Treat. with info 































Position in the 
group 
   











       





Period 15  -0.531  -1.509***  -1.419**  0.423  -1.864**  -0.490 
  (0.352)  (0.502)  (0.625)  (0.422)  (0.741)  (0.541) 
Constant  0.972***  1.518***  1.469***  1.521***  6.137***  4.646*** 
  (0.231)  (0.368)  (0.506)  (0.403)  (0.969)  (0.594) 
Observations  728  672  448  672  252  588 
R2  0.36  0.19  0.18  0.12  0.26  0.18 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         
     24 
 Table 5. Group Average Contribution by position in the game (N = 4) 
 
Group                   Sequential treatment with  info  Sequential treatment without info 
  All positions  First position    Last position  All positions  First position Last position 
1  4.58 
(3.67) 










2  6.23 
(3.11) 
7.33   
(1.87) 








3  5.15 
(2.99) 
6.86     
(2.16) 








4  5.53 
(3.31) 
6.33   
 (2.60) 



















6.93    
(2.93) 
4.4    
(2.13) 
2.86    
(2.58) 
































































Table 6. Group Average Contribution by position in the game (N = 8) 
 
Sequential treatment with  info  Sequential treatment without info 
  All positions  First position  Last position  All position  First position  Last position 
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 Table 7: Random-effects GLS regression of contribution by position 
 
  N=4    N=8   
























































   (.4204) 
3.2428*** 
(.3365) 
sigma_u  .95514034  1.2634  1.936  1.308 
sigma_e  2.9283759  3.4169  2.899  2.5716 





480  720  720 
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